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
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# Senator John Glenn

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for immediate release

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## CITING DOUBTS ON VERIFICATION, GLENN ANNOUNCES HE WILL VOTE AGAINST SALT II IN COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON---Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) declared today that he intends to press the case for tougher monitoring of Soviet compliance with the terms of SALT II and will vote against the treaty when it comes before the Foreign Relations Committee for final consideration later this week or next week.

"While I am for the SALT process, I am not in favor of sending the treaty to the full Senate at this time," Glenn told a news conference. "If we are forced to vote on the treaty in committee in the next few days, I must in good conscience vote against that action," Glenn said.

"I have said from the start of this debate that I will vote for the treaty only if we can adequately monitor and verify Soviet compliance with its terms at the time of the vote, not relying on future promises of a capability we may or may not be able to develop."

The loss of U.S. listening posts in Iran earlier this year gravely damaged American ability to monitor certain critical aspects of Soviet strategic tests, Glenn said, and Carter Administration efforts to recoup that capability elsewhere have not been successful yet.

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The Administration is making a major effort to regain

SALT, first ad.

an adequate monitoring capability. I give them an 'A' for effort but so far they have come up short. I've said for many months that I won't vote for SALT II unless it's verifiable, and I intend to stick to that pledge. If and when I'm satisfied that we can reliably monitor Soviet tests, then I'll be an eager spokesman for SALT. But for now I must oppose sending the treaty to the floor.

"This issue has been a key concern of mine for over two years. I've read every report cover to cover, attended countless hearings and briefings, and even visited the negotiators in Geneva. My concern on verification is not a newfound thing. Long before the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the pact, I urged that our government go slow and make sure SALT II was verifiable when it was sent to the Senate. The Administration chose to do otherwise, and I regret that decision."

Glenn indicated he was now generally satisfied with other provisions of the treaty, particularly since 13 understandings he sponsored were adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee.

"I don't buy the theory that we must take risks in order to placate the Russians," Glenn said. "That approach rarely works when dealing with the Soviet Union. I believe it's possible to have a good treaty, a workable treaty, a treaty that can be verified. Waiting until solid monitoring

capability is in place won't hurt the peace process and in fact will strengthen it.. That capability, on a reliable basis, may be realized in the near future, although details remain highly classified."

"When that occurs, both sides would be in a position to enter SALT III negotiations in a spirit of confidence. The American people, for instance, would support SALT III talks because we would know that the terms of SALT II were being met."

Glenn noted that one of the greatest problems in dealing with public discussion of verification is the classified nature of specific sources and methods.

"Much of what I know on this issue is classified material, and frankly that makes it mighty tough to discuss. Some of the material is super-sensitive."

"Generating an intelligent debate on verification thus has been almost impossible. The issues go <sup>to</sup> the very heart of our intelligence network around the world and must, of course, be secret. Yet, despite that major public relations problem, I think there is a growing awareness that SALT II is no panacea and that verification is a serious problem."

Glenn noted that many of his Understandings before the Foreign Relations Committee sought to close loopholes and ambiguities in the treaty.

SALT, third ad.

"I was determined that we not experience the mistakes of SALT I all over again. . In that treaty we relied heavily on unilateral statements to resolve contentious issues only to discover that the Soviets had no intention of abiding by our interpretations."

Glenn added that "once the U.S. realized that the Soviets were going to exploit loopholes and ambiguities in the treaty, we failed to call them to account for their actions. My Understandings are designed to hold the Administration's feet to the fire, making it difficult for them this time not to enforce the treaty forcefully."

"Once we realized they were doing this, we should have been far tougher negotiators at SALT II," said Glenn. "I think the Foreign Relations Committee has made the treaty better, and I can vote for it if and when we get the technical capability to monitor Soviet compliance."

JHG/11/7/79

Deputy to the DCI  
for Resource Management

November 8, 1979

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

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
Included in this package are:

--Talking points

--Charts which we will need to redo tomorrow  
in smoother copy. There is a complicated  
reason why the numbers do not add.

--The package we sent yesterday to the  
PRC(I)--the tentative decision letters  
and ZBB ranking.

I am free anytime tomorrow afternoon if  
you have any questions. - *we have an  
appointment at 4:00*



Attachments

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CHART 2

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